Communications of the Association for Information Systems
Volume 27

Article 6

8-2010

Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search
Advertising
Mark A. Rosso
School of Business, North Carolina Central University, mrosso@nccu.edu

Bernard J. Jansen
College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais
Recommended Citation
Rosso, Mark A. and Jansen, Bernard J. (2010) "Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search Advertising," Communications of the
Association for Information Systems: Vol. 27 , Article 6.
DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.02706
Available at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais/vol27/iss1/6

This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications of the
Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search Advertising

Mark A. Rosso
School of Business, North Carolina Central University
mrosso@nccu.edu

Bernard J. Jansen
College of Information Sciences and Technology, The Pennsylvania State University

The business models of major Web search engines depend on online advertising, primarily in the form of keyword
advertising. In recent years, a controversy has gained notoriety worldwide, in both the international court systems
and the media. It concerns a form of potential ―bait and switch‖ advertising where a consumer, searching using the
brand name of one company, is presented with an advertisement by a competitor of the searched-for brand. We
refer to this practice as ―piggybacking.‖ In the U.S. in particular, the legality of this practice, and the potential liability
of the search engines for contributing to trademark infringement, is unclear. However, the eventual resolutions of the
issue could significantly and negatively impact the business model of Internet search engines. In this paper, we
investigate the actual prevalence of piggybacking of major brands in U.S. search engines. We submitted 100 search
queries consisting of top global brand names to three major search engines. Analysis of 2,350 advertisements from
search engine results pages showed that just 4 percent were triggered by competitors‘ trademarked terms. There
was even lower use of those trademark terms in the ad text. Thus, overall competitive piggybacking does not appear
to be a deceptive or widespread phenomenon. Implications for this are discussed, and suggestions for future
research are presented.
Keywords: brand, deceptive advertising, e-commerce, intellectual property, Internet advertising, keyword
advertising, paid placement, paid search, passing off, pay per click, PPC, search advertising, search engine, search
engine marketing, sponsored search, trademark, trademark infringement, trust
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of keyword advertising has had a tremendous effect on online advertising, Internet marketing, search
engines, and websites that earn advertising revenue. Current projections predict that Internet advertising will
continue to grow and that keyword advertising, also known as sponsored search, contextual advertising, or pay-perclick (PPC) advertising, will be the dominant form [IDG, 2008]. Internet advertising provides the revenue base for
major search engines, such as Google and Yahoo!, as well as many content-based websites. In 2009, Google
earned $23.7 billion, and 97 percent of this revenue came from keyword advertising [Google, 2009]. Keyword
advertising is critical as a revenue stream for the major search engines and appears to be their major business
model for the foreseeable future.
Keyword advertising works as follows. When a searcher enters a query into a search engine, all or part of the query
may trigger the display of one or more ads on the search engine results page (SERP). If the searcher clicks on an
ad, a page from the advertiser‘s website (known as the landing page) is displayed. The advertiser is then charged by
the search engine (i.e., pay per click).
As Google and other search engine companies push to sell ads crucial to their revenue growth, some advertisers
are growing angry with the way the search engines oversee their keyword advertising [cf., Steel, 2008]. The problem
is a tactic that has been labeled, piggybacking, which we define in the context of search engine keyword advertising,
as advertisers selecting other companies‘ brand names, slogans, or other trademarked terms or phrases, as
keywords to trigger the display of their ads. We believe the term to be apropos, as this usage is consistent with the
dictionary definition, ―piggyback: to set up or cause to function in conjunction with something larger, more important,
or already in existence or operation‖ [Merriam-Webster, 2010]. In this sense, the advertiser‘s ad display is
piggybacking on the positive attributes of another organization‘s trademark.
One example is a television campaign by automaker Pontiac urging viewers to ―Google Pontiac‖ [Carty, 2006].
During the campaign, some consumers who searched using the term Pontiac were greeted by comparison ads
sponsored by competing automaker Mazda, which had bid on Pontiac‘s trademark. A few advertisers and others
have formed an organization, the Alliance Against Bait & Click, in order to ―make deceptive search ads a thing of the
past‖ [AABC, 2008]. There have been numerous U.S. court cases concerning the practice [cf., Ascentive, 2009;
Rescuecom, 2009]. However, the issue remains unresolved.
Google‘s policies have allowed piggybacking in the U.S., Canada, Ireland, and the U.K., and as of June 4, 2009,
Google expanded this practice virtually worldwide [Orey, 2009], with the notable exception of most countries in the
European Union [Naffziger, 2009b]. If piggybacking becomes more widespread, the results could significantly impact
advertisers, search engines, and customers. For example, if piggybacking causes consumer confusion, as some
advertisers claim [Sullivan, 2007], customers could become frustrated with sponsored search, leading to a drop in
the number of clicks on ads. Lower click through rates would decrease the revenue of the major search engine
companies, whose major income stream is keyword advertisements, as well as decrease the sales of current online
advertisers. Regardless of consumer reaction, widespread piggybacking will certainly increase the bidding, and thus
the cost of trademarked keywords, as well as encourage more large advertisers to bid on their own, now more
expensive, trademarks, thus increasing advertiser expenses. In addition, should the courts determine that
piggybacking can constitute trademark infringement and that search engines are at least partially liable for that
infringement, then search engines may face the expensive burden of monitoring each and every query for trademark
infringement:
We [Google] are currently defending this policy in trademark infringement lawsuits in the United States ….
Adverse results in these lawsuits may result in, or even compel, a change in this practice which could result
in a loss of revenue for us, which could harm our business.
Google, 2005, p. 27.

Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search Advertising

Given the multiple potential threats to the Internet search engine business model by the practice of piggybacking, it
seems important to understand the nature and prevalence of the piggybacking phenomenon. How widespread and
deceptive is piggybacking? Is it truly a potential major threat that begs for comprehensive user impact studies? Or is
the piggybacking controversy simply a play by larger advertisers to stifle competition for customers, as well as
minimize advertising costs? There is little research, and no comprehensive survey, of piggybacking in this area to
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date. The major contribution of our research is to examine the prevalence and potential deceptiveness of a practice
that may have wide-ranging negative consequences for the entire global search engine industry.
This research analyzes the search results of three major U.S. search engines after the 100 top global brand
trademarks were submitted to each of them as 100 individual search queries. A classification of piggybacking ads
was developed, with an analysis of their prevalence overall, as well as by market sector. The implications of these
results for the future of keyword advertising are discussed, with suggestions for future research. First, we present
the conceptual background of the intertwining issues and stakeholders which come into play in this phenomenon of
piggybacking.

II. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Overviews and histories of keyword advertising are available [Fain and Pedersen, 2006; Jansen and Mullen, 2008],
including an analysis of search engine marketing strategy [Sen, 2005]. The terminology surrounding the practice of
piggybacking is varied and inconsistent. O‘Connor [2007], the only academic researcher to our knowledge who has
currently published in this area, simply refers to it as trademark abuse, a category which could presumably include
more than what is defined here as piggybacking. Steel [2008] defines piggybacking to include the unapproved use of
the trademark in the actual text of the ad. Without the trademark in the ad text, the unapproved use of a trademark to
trigger the ad is termed a conquest buy. When the 2008 campaign of U.S. presidential candidate John McCain
bought Joe Biden as a political advertising keyword, the practice was referred to as an ambush strategy [Steel and
Vranica, 2008].
Regardless of specific terminology, search marketing experts recommend buying competitors‘ keywords as an
effective strategy [e.g., Stern, 2008]—despite the legal uncertainty. Although there has been substantial litigation to
date [Sullivan, 2007], the legality of piggybacking with regard to trademark infringement remains unclear, at least in
part because many cases have been settled out-of-court, thus establishing few legal precedents. In the cases in
which verdicts have been reached, the U.S. courts are split on whether piggybacking constitutes trademark
infringement by either the advertiser or the search engine [Grimmelmann, 2007].
The legal issues involved have been analyzed in numerous law review articles [e.g., Goldman, 2005; McGeveran,
2008; Troxclair, 2005]. For example, Goldman [2005] examines the perspectives of searchers, publishers, and
search providers, and concludes that trademark law should be updated. From the consumers‘ perspective, the
relevancy of the actual content presented by search engines should be considered, and search engines should be
given protection from liability as encouragement to deliver the most relevant content to consumers. Schecter and
Thomas [2003] add that it is the role of trademark law to balance the wishes of those who would monopolize the use
of a trademark with the wishes of ―others who feel they have a right or need to use it for their own purposes‖ (p.
540). However, legal scholars still have much to do in the area of search engine law [Grimmelmann, 2007]. They
generally agree that these issues are years away from legal resolution [e.g., Troxclair, 2005].
Currently, all three major search advertising platforms‘ policies prohibit ―trademark-infringing‖ uses of ads or
keywords [Google, 2009; Microsoft, 2009; Yahoo!, 2009]. However, they require aggrieved trademark holders to file
a complaint with them before any corrective action may be taken. Thus, the burden of trademark enforcement falls
on the advertiser and not the search engine. The big difference among the search engines is that only Google allows
piggybacking (with the exception of 30+ countries, mostly in Europe, many in which litigation is taking place)
[Naffziger, 2009a]. Google will not investigate complaints alleging trademark infringement based solely on the
purchase of brand names or other trademarks to trigger advertisements. Thus, Google is taking the legal position
that piggybacking does not constitute trademark infringement. That is why advertisers may be angry at Google in
particular.
A key factor in this controversy is the great importance of brand names in e-commerce. Research has shown the
prevalence of brand names as search terms [e.g., Ghose and Yang, 2008a; Ghose and Yang, 2008b; Pan, Litvin,
and O‘Donnell, 2007]. Brands have been found to raise consumer intent to purchase in both traditional and internet
distribution channels [Lee, Ang, and Dubelaar, 2005; Ye, 2007], as they function as signals of trustworthiness. It is
already widely accepted that consumer trust is essential for the success of e-commerce [e.g., Hoffman, Novak, and
Peralta, 1999].
Yet, trust has already been shown to be an issue with perceived relevance of sponsored ads [cf., Jansen, 2007;
Jansen and Resnick, 2006]. Research participants also indicated trustworthiness as an issue. If consumers perceive
piggybacking to also be deceptive, that would make matters worse. For example, research on online advertising
[Rohrer and Boyd, 2004] has found that deceptive advertising can negatively affect the user experience at Yahoo!.
Given that search engines depend on advertising to fund their business models, they may not want to encourage
practices that could jeopardize consumer trust. Grazioli and Jarvenpaa [2003] put it this way, ―the collapse of
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telemarketing revenues during the 1980s, largely ascribed to the loss of consumer trust, is a warning of what might
happen to e-commerce if public trust in the medium fades‖ (pp. 93–94). Thus, should piggybacking be found to be
both widespread and deceptive, it‘s effect on e-commerce and Internet search engines could be devastating.

III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Despite the worldwide controversy over predatory keyword advertising, there has been little empirical investigation
into the phenomenon. How prevalent is piggybacking? Does it differ among search engines? What is the effect on
ad placement? Does the practice vary among industries? These are the motivators for our research.

Research Question #1: What are the various forms of piggybacking?
The limited research available currently lumps all piggybacking together. However, we can conceive of piggybacking
taking many forms. For example, taking customers away from the competition is what often comes to mind in a
discussion of piggybacking, as in Mazda courting searchers looking for Pontiac automobiles [Carty, 2006]. Certainly,
companies might be concerned about the use of their trademark in these situations. However, what if the
trademarked term is used by other retailers selling the company‘s products, for example, a store promoting a
specific manufacturers‘ electronics gear? Thus, instances of piggybacking may span a range of seeming legitimacy.
How much diversity is there among advertisers in terms of types of piggybacking, and how does this vary across
industries? We seek to define piggybacking in a more systematic way that permits detailed investigation of the
phenomenon.

Research Question #2: How prevalent is piggybacking?
Media attention and advertiser lawsuits [e.g., Steel, 2008; Sullivan, 2007] may suggest that piggybacking is a
common practice. But is it? This research investigates the 100 top global brands in the U.S. and the results of
searches of these brand names on three major search engines in order to get a clearer picture of piggybacking,
particularly in terms of its prevalence.

Research Question #3: How does piggybacking vary by market sector?
Does piggybacking occur primarily in the travel industry, as one might conclude from the press [e.g., May, 2009;
Steel, 2008], or is it more widespread? The brands selected for study here span across sixteen market sectors,
providing a wider picture of the practice.

IV. RESEARCH METHODS
In order to get a broad view of the piggybacking phenomenon, we selected a collection of brands that spanned
across many diverse market sectors. Our focus was on large brands because it has been suggested that
piggybacking is most effective when smaller companies try to take advantage of the well-established brand‘s
goodwill or of larger, more dominant organizations‘ reputations [e.g., Steel, 2008; Stern, 2008]. We explored several
lists of brands on the Web, including The American Customer Satisfaction Index [ACSI, 2006], Business Week‘s Top
Brand 100 [Business Week, 2009], and BrandZ Top 100 Most Powerful Brands Ranking [Millward, Brownmor,
Optimor, 2008]. After examination of these three brand lists, we selected the BrandZ Top 100 Most Powerful Brands
Ranking because this list provided substantial details about the brands and categorized each brand into a market
sector. The brand list is provided in Appendix A.
Each of these 100 brands was submitted to Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Live Search (MSN Live). These three
search engines were selected because they were the largest keyword advertising platforms in the sponsored search
area.
We submitted each brand as a query to one of the search engines, capturing the first two search engine results
pages. Given that 80 percent of searchers never go past the second page [Jansen and Spink, 2005], we decided
that capturing just the first two SERPs was appropriate. In each query, we included only the brand name with no
other terms. For example, we used the query Tide rather than a phrase like Tide detergent. We did this because the
keyword advertising platforms have a variety of matching functions, including a ―broad match.‖ So, if terms other
than the brand name were included in the query, the non-brand term might have been the term that triggered the ad.
Using only the brand name helped to ensure that the brand name, rather than another term, triggered the ad,
although a few brand names that contain generic terms (e.g. bank, mobile) still triggered other advertisements. This
process of submitting the query and capturing the first two SERPs was repeated for each brand and each search
engine.
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First, the number of organic (aka, non-sponsored or natural) search results for each query was recorded. Next, for
each sponsored ad captured, the following information was collected or assigned:
a. Indication of ad placement by brandholder (self-bid)—If the landing page of the ad was determined to
be one of the brand‘s official websites, we assumed that the advertiser had bid on its own brand name.
This was then noted. For all other sponsored ads, we coded the piggybacking type (below). Our thought
process was that, since the query contained only the brand term, any ad that was not from that brand
must be a form of piggybacking.
b. Piggybacking type—Type is derived from a content analysis of sponsored ads and is discussed later.
c.

Ad position—Keyword advertisements typically appear in three locations on the SERP. These three
locations are referred to in the industry as North, East, and South as shown in Figure 1. The North
position, above the organic search results, is considered to be the most desirable for an advertiser. A
sponsored ad‘s position on the SERP is determined by the search engine, based on the advertiser‘s bid
and the search engine‘s estimate of ad quality. Ad position is an interesting variable for several
reasons. First, it is well-established that link location influences how often a link is clicked [e.g., Jansen
and Spink, 2009]. Second, the position of a sponsored link may affect the likelihood of consumer
confusion between brands [cf., Brooks, 2004; Jansen and Resnick, 2006; O'Connor, 2009].

d. Occurrence of the brand name in the ad title, text, or URL (see Figure 2)—In addition to advertiser
complaints about piggybacking, unauthorized use of companies‘ trademarks displaying in the ad have
also drawn complaints [e.g., Steel, 2008]. Like piggybacking, enforcement of trademark policies by the
search engine is not undertaken until the advertiser complains directly to the search engine.

Figure 1. Locations of Sponsored Ads
.
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Source: http://www.whyiblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/adsample.jpg.

Figure 2. Elements of a Sponsored Ad—Example from Google
Conventional content analysis [Krippendorff, 1980] is ―usually appropriate when existing theory or research literature
on a phenomenon is limited‖ [Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279]. We used inductive category development, allowing
the categories to be grounded in the data. Each author examined a small sample of ads first, and then the two
authors compared findings and developed the single classification presented here. Following several discussions
and generations of coding rules for each ad type, the two authors divided the coding task. One author coded brands
1–50, while the other coded brands 51–100. Inter-coder reliability for the piggybacking classification was estimated
by coding 10 percent of the 300 queries by both authors. To confirm the level of agreement, inter-coder reliability
was checked by Cohen‘s Kappa [Landis and Koch, 1977]. Cohen‘s Kappa was 0.807, which is on the borderline
between ―substantial‖ and ―almost perfect‖ agreement.

V. RESULTS
Our 100 queries on the three search engines generated 8,345 results on the 600 SERPs. Of these results, 5,995
were organic, and 2,350 were sponsored.

Research Question #1: What are the various forms of piggybacking?
As shown in Table 1, we derived a classification of piggybacking advertisements.
Table 1: Types of Piggybacking
Types of Piggybacking

Explanation

a. Competitive

Obvious competitor (i.e., in the same industry selling a competitive
product/service)

b. Promotional

Promoting product/service of the brand (e.g., a reseller of the brand or some
other function that assists in selling the product, i.e. coupons or free samples)

c. Orthogonal

Offering a different product/service from the product/service offered by the
brand (e.g., corporate information about the brandholder, training on the
brandholder‘s product, information on the general subject area of the
brandholder‘s product area, etc.)

The first class, ―Competitive,‖ includes ads on which a competitor to the brand obviously bid on the brand name.
This is the common definition or understanding of piggybacking. Figure 3 shows an example of carmaker Infiniti
displaying an ad on Google in response to the query ―BMW‖ (the brand of a competing automaker). In this example,
the search term is not displayed in the text of the ad. It is the official Infiniti site. Nevertheless, some advertisers
object to this type of use of their trademarks, interpreting it as a competitor taking advantage of the goodwill of their
trademark.
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Figure 3. Sponsored Ad from Google—Triggered by the Search Query: “BMW,”
an Example of “Competitive” Piggybacking
The second type of piggybacking is ―Promotional.‖ These advertisements direct searchers to a landing page of a
company or organization that is in some way, either formally or informally, promoting one or more of the brand‘s
products or services. Figure 4 shows an example of CVS, the pharmacy retailer, displaying an ad on Microsoft
LiveSearch in response to the query ―L‘Oreal‖ (the brand of a beauty products company). In this example, the search
term appears in both the title and text of the ad. Currently, all three search engines allow resellers to do this. This
appears to be a legitimate case of a retailer selling a manufacturer‘s product.

Figure 4. Sponsored Ad from MSN LiveSearch—Triggered by the Search Query: “L’Oreal,”
an Example of “Promotional” Piggybacking
The third type of piggybacking is ―Orthogonal.‖ In this form of piggybacking, the advertisement landing page is not
that of the brand, a competitor, or a promoter of the brand. Instead, these landing pages are typically information
websites providing information or opinion concerning the brand. The product/service provided is completely different
from that of the brandholder. Figure 5 shows an example of Hoover‘s, a business information aggregator, displaying
an ad on Yahoo! in response to the query ―ibm‖ (the global computer systems and services company). In this
example, the searched-for brand name appears in the ad title. Currently, all three search engines allow informational
sites to do this. Clearly, Hoover‘s is not selling IBM products/services or products/services that compete with those
of IBM. This appears to be a legitimate case of using a trademark to refer to a company.

Ibm
Locations, products, execs, financials, competitors, &
more. View now.
www.hoovers.com
Figure 5. Sponsored Ad from Yahoo!—Triggered by the Search Query: “ibm,”
an Example of “Orthogonal” Piggybacking

Research Question #2: How prevalent is piggybacking?
Table 2 shows the total number of links (organic search results and sponsored ads) found on the 600 SERPs from
the three search engines broken down by number of organic results, number of sponsored ads, and number of
sponsored ads that were classified as one of the three types of piggybacking ads.
Page for page, Google displayed fewer sponsored ads than the other two search engines did. Table 2 also shows
that piggybacking (as a percentage of total sponsored ads) is a fairly common occurrence with percentages ranging
from a low of 63.9 percent of occurrence on Google to a high of 94.3 percent on Yahoo!. An ANOVA clearly shows
that there is a difference in number of piggybacked sponsored ads across search engines (F(2) = 54.67 , p <= 0.01).
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Table 2: Occurrences of Piggybacking by Search Engine

Google
Yahoo!
MSN

Total
Links
2269
3278
2798
8345

Organic
Results
2000
2000
1995
5995

Sponsored
Ads
269
1278
803
2350

Piggybacking
Ads
172
1191
677
2040

%
Piggybacking
63.9
93.2
84.3
86.8

Next, we looked at piggybacking by type. Of the 300 search queries of brand names, twenty-seven, or 9 percent,
contained at least one instance of competitive piggybacking. By search engine, these twenty-seven queries were
broken down by search engine as follows: Yahoo!—11, Google—9, and MSN—7. Overall, twenty-three of the 100
brands were piggybacked by competitors. The ad occurrence of piggybacking by type, by position, and by search
engine is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Occurrences of Piggybacking by Type and Ad Position
Search
Engine
Google

Yahoo!

MSN Live

Piggybacking
Type
Competitive
Promotional
Orthogonal
Total by Position
Competitive
Promotional
Orthogonal
Total by Position
Competitive
Promotional
Orthogonal
Total by Position

North

0
2
0
2
8
106
40
154
8
87
82
177

North
% of
Type
0.0
100.0
0.0
100.0
5.2
68.8
26.0
100.0
4.5
49.2
46.3
100.0

East

11
132
27
170
35
509
236
780
5
221
141
367

East
% of
Type
6.5
77.6
15.9
100.0
4.5
65.3
30.3
100.0
1.4
60.3
38.3
100.0

South

0
0
0
0
9
157
91
257
5
67
61
133

South
% of
Type
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.5
61.1
35.4
100.0
3.8
50.4
45.9
100.0

Total
by
Type
11
134
27
172
52
772
367
1191
18
375
284
677

Total
% by
Type
6.4
77.9
15.7
100.0
4.4
64.8
30.8
100.0
2.7
55.4
41.9
100.0

Despite the high occurrences of piggybacking (shown in Table 2), closer examination presents a somewhat different
picture. The vast majority of piggybacking is the Promotional type, ranging from 55.4 percent on MSN Live to 77.9
percent on Google. The second most frequently occurring type of piggybacking is Orthogonal, ranging from 15.7
percent on Google to 41.9 percent on MSN Live. What is most interesting, however, is the low occurrence of
Competitive piggybacking, which has generated controversy in some circles, including in the press. The occurrence
of this type of piggybacking is in the single digits for all search engines, ranging from a low of 2.7 percent on MSN
Live to a high of 6.4 percent on Google. We see that in general the majority of occurrences of piggybacking were
positioned in the East ads, and not in the higher visibility, more frequently clicked ads in the North position. Google‘s
policy at the time of the study was to avoid placing ads in the South position.

Research Question #3: How does piggybacking vary by market sector?
The percentage of piggybacking in sponsored ads varied from 50 percent to 98.4 percent across the market sectors.
An ANOVA shows a significant difference across the sectors (F(15) = 5.36, p <= 0.01). Table 4 breaks down the
occurrence of piggybacking across market sectors and by type. There is little Competitor piggybacking (as a
percentage of sponsored ads), ranging from 0 percent to 20.9 percent across all sectors, with no significant
difference among industries (F(15) = 0.73, p = 0.75). There was also no significant difference for Orthogonal
piggybacking (F(15) = 1.35, p = 0.17). However, the sectors vary significantly in terms of the percentages for
Promotional (F(15) = 7.95 , p <= 0.01)).
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Table 4: Occurrences of Piggybacking by Type and Market Sector
Sector

Competitive

% of
Sector

Promotional

% of
Sector

Orthogonal

13

14.8%

57

74.0%

18

23.4%

88

4.3%

1
4
0
1

1.7%
1.0%
0.0%
2.6%

15
298
0
7

25.9%
77.4%
0.0%
18.4%

42
87
4
31

72.4%
22.6%
100.0%
81.6%

58
389
4
39

2.8%
19.1%
0.2%
1.9%

0
0
17
4
5
1
0
1
19
15
0

0.0%
0.0%
6.7%
4.9%
3.2%
0.8%
0.0%
1.6%
20.9%
2.6%
0.0%

23
4
124
32
138
76
23
27
5
449
3

76.7%
11.4%
51.7%
40.0%
91.4%
58.5%
79.3%
42.9%
6.8%
79.2%
21.4%

7
31
114
46
13
53
6
35
67
113
11

23.3%
88.6%
47.5%
57.5%
8.6%
40.8%
20.7%
55.6%
90.5%
19.9%
78.6%

30
35
255
82
156
130
29
63
91
577
14

1.5%
1.7%
12.5%
4.0%
7.6%
6.4%
1.4%
3.1%
4.5%
28.3%
0.7%

81
5.06

4.0%
3.8%

1,281
80.06

62.8%
47.2%

678
42.38

33.2%
52.0%

2040
127.50

100.0%
6.3%

Apparel
Beverages
Cars
Cigarettes
Consumer
Goods
Entertainment
Fast Food
Financial
Insurance
Luxury
Mobile
Motorcycles
Personal Care
Retail
Technology
Transportation
Total
Average

% of Total of
Sector Sector

% of All
Sectors

Additional Results
In addition to the bidding on branding terms, advertiser complaints about trademark use also include the use of their
brand names by others in the text of sponsored ads [cf., Steel, 2008]. Table 5 summarizes the occurrences of thirdparty brand names found in the ads‘ text, broken down by search engine and type of the ad in the SERP. As shown
in Table 5, the use of trademarked terms by competitors is extremely low.
Table 5: Occurrences of Brand Term in Ad
Mention of
Brand
Google
Yahoo!
MSN
Total

137
943
534
1614

Sponsored
Total
269
1278
803
2350

% Mention

Competitive

Promotional

Orthogonal

50.9%
73.8%
66.5%
68.7%

0
2
4
6

109
660
401
1170

28
281
129
438

As shown in Table 6, those six competitive piggybacking ad occurrences are the result of just two ads, one ad in one
query on MSN Live, and one ad in one query on Yahoo!.
Table 6: Competitive Piggybacking Ads with Brand Names in Ad Text
Ad:

Cisco - fonality.com
Small Business Phone System. 15-500 Employees?
Try Fonality.

Advertiser:
Search engine:
Search query:
# Ad impressions:
Positions of impressions:

Fonality
MSN Live
Cisco
4
North/South on first two SERPs

Genesis - Official Site
Better Braking than the Mercedes & Affordable.
Think About it.
HyundaiGenesis.com

Hyundai
Yahoo!
Mercedes
2
East/South on first SERP

Volume 27

Article 6

89

VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Issues in the Piggybacking Classification Development
We considered creating finer-grain categories in the classification. For example, the Promotional category contains
mainly two types of advertisers: traditional retailers (e.g., car dealers, pharmacies, and department stores) and
comparison shopping web merchants (e.g., Shopzilla, NexTag, Pronto, etc.). There is also a small contingent of
sites offering coupons or free samples of the brand‘s products. The Orthogonal category contains advertisers
offering products/services that, although unrelated to the brand‘s products/services, vary in degree of direct
relevance to the brand. For example, as previously noted in Figure 5, an ad by Hoovers.com was triggered by the
brand, IBM. Although their service of providing corporate information is unrelated to IBM‘s products and services, the
information itself being promoted is about IBM (i.e., directly related to the brand). Contrast this with an ad triggered
by the query, ―CocaCola‖ by BuyBetterTickets.com for the CocaCola 600, a NASCAR racing event that‘s really not
about beverages. Thus, the Orthogonal ads varied greatly in relevance to the triggering brand term. Also, another,
smaller portion of Orthogonal ads were triggered by brand names that were homonyms. For example, the brand,
Marlboro, triggered an ad for a hotel in Marlborough, a suburb of Boston, with the hotel presumably trying to
capitalize on searchers‘ mis-spellings. Finally, the Competitive category could have been broken into two: those
competitive ads that used the brand in the actual ad text and those that did not (which were only six of 1,614
piggybacking ads with brand mentions, see Table 5).
We chose the three broad piggybacking classes because the focus of our study is how organizations use others‘
brands to trigger ads resulting from consumers‘ search queries. From the perspective of the brandholder, assuming
that a searcher is intending to find the brandholder‘s products/services, piggybacking can result in three broad
situation types. The brandholder can be possibly threatened by the display of a competitor‘s ad, possibly helped by a
third party‘s ad promoting the brandholder, or unaffected by an advertisement that is orthogonal to the brandholder‘s
purposes. Also, the Promotional and Orthogonal categories correspond well with the ―reseller‖ and ―informational
site‖ categories of exceptions for using others‘ trademarks, found in both Microsoft‘s and Yahoo‘s policies. Thus, we
believe that the three higher-level categories fit well with the focus of the research.

Piggybacking in Terms of Prevalence and Deception
This research explored a variety of types of relationships between advertisers who bid on others‘ trademarks, and
the trademark holders. The results clearly show that the majority of ads triggered by brands were, in fact, sponsored
by organizations other than the brandholder—86.8 percent. Other organizations‘ ads to sell or promote the
brandholder‘s products/services comprised 62.8 percent of those piggybacking ads. Approximately, another third of
the piggybacking ads promote non-competing products/services, while only the remaining 4 percent of the ads were
of a directly competitive nature. Thus, it is not unusual (with any of the three major search engines) for organizations
to use another organization‘s brand to trigger an ad. However, the percentage of Competitive ads is comparatively
small.
Regarding the potential deceptiveness of piggybacking as ―bait and switch‖ advertising, only six of 1,614 ad
occurrences (0.3 percent) contained the competitor‘s actual trademark in the ad text. Table 6 shows the two ads that
caused those six occurrences: one by the car-maker, Hyundai, and the other by telephony provider, Fonality. The
reader can see that the former is a fairly straightforward comparison advertisement. The latter, however, using their
competitor‘s name as the headline, could easily be interpreted as an advertisement for the searched-for brand, when
in fact it is not. This was the only instance we found in over two-thousand advertisements in which a competitive
trademark appeared to be used in a potentially deceptive manner. Thus, the alleged deceptiveness of piggybacking,
claimed by some [AABC, 2008], eroding trust in e-commerce, appears in actuality to be a non-issue.
We found that piggybacking clearly differs by market sector (Table 4). However, in terms of piggybacking type, only
the Promotional type was found to vary by sector. With the caveat of a small sample, the retail and apparel sectors
had the highest percentages of competitive piggybacking. The travel sector, some of whose members have
identified themselves as victims of piggybacking [Steel, 2008; AABC, 2008], was not represented in the list of the top
global brands.

Google and Brand Searches
One striking result is how many fewer total sponsored ads Google displayed for a query in comparison to the
Microsoft and Yahoo!—an average of less than one ad on the first two SERPS. This is compared to an average of
approximately four ads for Yahoo, and about two and two-third ads for MSN. Of that lower total of sponsored ads
displayed, Google displayed a lower percentage of them as piggybacking ads as well. It would be interesting to be
able to compare these numbers to those of other types of (non-brand-triggered) queries.
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Several different strands of the data, when considered together, could be interpreted to indicate that Google may
have done a better job of delivering relevant ads to these brand-name queries, while at the same time, providing
brandholders less of a risk of threat by competitive ads. Given that Google has often been vilified in the press for its
refusal to disallow piggybacking [e.g., Steel, 2008], this indeed would be an interesting result.
Following is the analysis. It is based on the assumption (which could be verified by future user studies) that, in
general, the presence of a brand-name in a query usually means that the searcher is looking-for/interested-in that
brandholder‘s product or service. Certainly, it is difficult in general to infer searcher intent based strictly on a query‘s
search terms [Russell et al., 2009]. However, considering the entire set of queries, it does not seem unreasonable to
assume that, in general, the searcher in most cases is interested in the brand‘s products or services. Given that
assumption, we can broadly classify the ad-types we‘ve studied here into a general hierarchy of relevance toward
these brand-related queries. For example, in general, it is reasonable to believe that the ―self-bid‖ ads, those
sponsored by the brandholder, would be the most relevant to the brand query. Again, there will be exceptions (e.g.,
a query to discover the current IBM stock price, or directions to the nearest Wal-Mart), but overall, we assume that
most of the searchers‘ interests are focused on the brand product/service. Thus, by definition, on average, the selfbids ads as a group would be more relevant than any of the types of piggybacking ads. Following the same logic, the
next most relevant type of ad triggered by the brand name would be the Promotional piggybacking type. It promotes
the same product/service as the brandholder. In general, it might not be as relevant as the brandholder‘s ad, but it
would on average be more definitely more relevant than the Orthogonal ad type, and usually more relevant than the
Competitive piggybacking type because the Promotional type deals with the brandholder specified in the query.
Thus, given these assumptions, we propose a three-level hierarchy of relevance to brand-related queries: self-bid,
Promotional piggybacking and a third, least relevant level containing the Competitive and Orthogonal piggybacking
ads. Given this hierarchy, and our general assumption of brand product/service interest, Google looks like it serves
up the most relevant ads in response to brand queries. It has, by orders of magnitude, the highest percentage of
self-bid ads, the highest level of relevance in the hierarchy (Table 7), especially considering that almost half of
MSN‘s self-bid ads are in the least visible South position, below all the organic search results and all the other ads.
Google also leads handily in the second highest level of relevance in the hierarchy, Promotional piggybacking ads
(Table 3). Thus, all other things being equal (which would need to be verified by future research), based on types of
ads and seemingly reasonable assumptions we made those about types of ads and searchers‘ intent, Google‘s
results appear to be more relevant to these queries containing major brandholders‘ brands.

Google
Yahoo!
MSN
Total

Table 7: Occurrences of Self-Bidding
Sponsored Total Self-bid
%
North
Total
Self-bid
269
97
36.1%
30
1278
87
6.8%
65
803
126
15.7%
54
2350
310
13.2%
149

East

South

67
12
14
93

0
10
58
68

Further, one could assert that Google‘s results pose less of a threat to brandholders when their marks are used as
search terms, based on examining where the ads are placed vis-à-vis the organic results, in the North, East, or
South positions. To simplify the analysis, we make the reasonable assumption the North position poses the
predominant threat of competitive piggybacking to brandholders. Our data bolsters this assumption in that the vast
majority of queries found the brandholder in the #1 organic result position. (In the few cases where this was not true,
most of the time the brandholder was #2, following the Wikipedia entry of the brandholder. A small number of
exceptions were foreign brands like Ariel (detergent), and TIM (Telecom Italia Mobile), which are extremely
polysemous and less-searched-for in the English versions of the search engines we tested. Thus, Competitive ads
will usually be seen first by the searcher only if they appear in the North position [e.g., Richardson et al., 2007]. So,
by putting mostly self-bid ads and no Competitive piggybacking ads in North, the threat to Google‘s advertisers was
minimized.
In contrast, although the number is low, both Yahoo! and MSN put competitive ads in North (Table 3). Further, they
put significant percentages of Promotional piggybacking ads, which although supporting the brandholders (mostly as
resellers), often promote competitive products/services as well. Thus, despite unfavorable press and lawsuits on this
subject, one could argue that Google actually provides advertisers with a more hospitable advertising environment.
Again, further research is necessary to establish this. Examining ad positions also bolsters the argument for Google
having comparatively more relevant search results for these queries. Both Yahoo! and MSN put significant
percentages of Orthogonal piggybacking ads in the North position. Finally, we again caution that ad relevance is
ultimately judged by search engine users, and these phenomena need to be verified by user studies.
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Microsoft Bing and Brand Searches
In the time since our data collection, Microsoft has introduced the Bing search engine which is reported to address
many of the issues discussed here regarding brand searches (Wallace, 2009). Wallace reports that Bing often limits
or downgrades the visibility of sponsored ads in general. Thus, the number of less relevant ads resulting from brand
searches (e.g., Orthogonal piggybacking) may be reduced and/or decreased in visibility. This is a win for the
consumer, but maybe not for the brandholder, because of the following. Wallace describes Bing‘s ―Similar to this‖
feature: ―Bing almost always shows highly visible links to competitors on branded searches‖ (see Figure 6).
Regarding the links in Bing‘s Similar to This feature, Wallace (2009) asserts:
…this is likely to decrease CTR [clickthrough rate] on branded terms and increase comparison
shopping by users. Furthermore, it‘s clear that it is focusing on the most significant competitors—so
the consequence is not going to be the same for different brands. For larger, more established brands,
they would be more likely to show on competitor branded searches than lesser known brands. So
lesser known brands will have a reduction in branded click traffic because of an increase in diverted
traffic to competitors, but will not have a corresponding increase in traffic from its competitors. In other
words, smaller brands get hurt and bigger brands get helped by this system.
Wallace, 2009.
This then puts competitive links adjacent to the brandholder‘s organic search result. This benefit again goes to the
consumer, and to the major brandholder, by eliminating the need for the competitive bidding that Google seems to
be encouraging. On the downside, Microsoft loses the potential revenue while the brandholders can no longer
prevent the more significant competitors from appearing with them. However, if lesser-known or unknown brands
were to flee from Bing, that could potentially increase the perceived relevance of Bing‘s sponsored ads, as
compared with other search engines. However, this could also be perceived as reducing the diversity of
advertisements with a resulting constriction of consumer choice.

Figure 6. Screenshot of Microsoft’s Bing Search Engine SERP—Triggered by the Query: “geico”

Limitations and Strengths of this Work
The limitations of our study are that we examined only the largest major brands. Although we believe that this brand
selection method returns results similar to that from the market as a whole, other brand listings or market niches
might produce different results. Also, advertisers may vary their ads based on time of day, week, season, and locale.
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In addition, the specific ads displayed can be affected by competitive bidding at the time the search query is made.
There are several strengths of the study. First, we used a large number of well-known brands with major impact from
a variety of industry sections. This ensured our results have practical and influential implications. Second, we
approached our analysis of piggybacking from a variety of perspectives, using a mixed methods approach and
employing both quantitative and qualitative measures. This helped ensure that our findings are robust. Third, our
focus on piggybacking is an emerging area with potentially significant impact on the advertising and search engines
area. Therefore, our research is timely and has practical implications in the marketplace.

VII. FUTURE RESEARCH
Although it seems like piggybacking is not a widespread or deceptive threat to e-commerce, there are still many
research opportunities to follow-up on this exploratory study. For example, this work could be reproduced with
different brands, different market sectors, and using non-U.S. search engines. Further, studies of user perceptions
are crucial when considering issues like deceptiveness and relevance of advertisements. Future research could
involve in-depth analysis of search behavior to see whether piggybacking improves or degrades the customer
experience, and whether trust in the search engine is affected. Other e-commerce platforms with search capabilities,
such as Amazon or eBay, could be explored in terms of potentially deceptive use of trademarks. Social networking
sites also allow the possibility of using other companies‘ brand names. For example, Needleman [2009] reports of an
instance on Twitter.com in which a company created a profile named for a competitor but promoted its own services
instead. Also, the effect of piggybacking on keyword prices would be of interest to search engines and advertisers.
Previous work by Stewart [2006; Stewart and Malaga, 2009] provides plausible theories to be tested that relate to
piggybacking. For example, Stewart and Malaga [2009] found an ―assimilation effect‖ among adjacent links which
raised consumers‘ trusting beliefs in an unfamiliar organization when its link was surrounded by links of trusted
organizations. Given this result, the authors go on to suggest ―a new Web search business model‖ in which
companies could bid on which other companies‘ links would appear next to them. They further suggest that ―an
unfamiliar company might bid to appear along with familiar trusted companies in the same industry‖ (p. 88)—exactly
what can happen when a lesser-known company piggybacks on a dominant brand. The piggybacker‘s ad appears
near the major brand‘s organic listing(s) (as well as their ad, if the major brand self-bid). Is there an assimilation
effect in this case? Future research could test whether this trust transfer from familiar to unfamiliar company works in
the search advertising context. If so, this would be empirical evidence of the value of piggybacking for less dominant
brands. (As an aside: given Stewart and Malaga‘s result, Bing‘s policy of excluding these brands from its ―Similar to
This‖ list (Figure 6) would prevent this assimilation effect from benefitting small advertisers.)
Stewart [2006] also found a similar trust transfer to an unknown company, if it was linked to by a trusted
organization. Given these two situations of trust transfer from a trusted to an unknown company, is there a similar
transfer of trust when the ad of an unknown company appears as a result of a search for the brand name of a
trusted organization? This would also be an interesting property of piggybacking.

VIII. CONCLUSION
With the study‘s scope and limitations in mind, we have shown that competitive piggybacking is not the widespread,
deceptive practice that some would have us believe. Only 4 percent of the ad displays studied was competitive in
nature, and only one advertisement sampled was found to be potentially deceptive regarding its sponsor.
This study has filled a gap in the existing literature by comprehensively examining the phenomenon of piggybacking,
which could have great impact on consumers, advertisers, and search engines alike. We have created a taxonomy
of piggybacking, and used it to hypothesize, for example, that although Google has been blamed for its stance on
the piggybacking issue, it may be providing the most relevant results, while at the same time, placing competitive
ads in positions of lower visibility.
We sympathize with stakeholders on all sides of the piggybacking issue. Large advertisers want to ―own‖ the pages
that result from searches for their brand names. They prefer not to have competitors show up at all in ―their‖ search
results. Also, they prefer not to pay high prices for their own brand names as ad triggers, or even have to bid at all
on trademarks that they already own. On the other hand, search engines want to provide the most relevant results to
consumers while protecting or increasing the ad revenue which funds their business models. As researchers, there
are many opportunities to add data to the debate. Findings on user perceptions of trust and satisfaction, effects on
advertising costs, and resulting advertising strategies can only help us increase our understanding of the consumer
search process in e-commerce.
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APPENDIX A—LIST OF BRANDS USED AS SEARCH QUERIES

Rank

Brand

1 Google
2 GE
(General Electric)
3 Microsoft
4 Coca-Cola
5 China Mobile
6 IBM
7 Apple

Technology
Beverages
Mobile
Technology
Technology

53
54
55
56
57

8 McDonald‘s
9 Nokia
10 Marlboro

49,499 Fast Food
43,975 Technology
37,324 Cigarettes

58
59
60

11 Vodafone
12 Toyota
13 Wal-Mart

36,962 Mobile
35,134 Cars
34,547 Retail

61
62
63

14
15
16
17
18

33,092
30,318
29,278
28,015
28,004

64
65
66
67
68
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Table A-1: List of Brands Used as Search Queries
Brand
Market
Rank
Brand
Brand
Market
Value ($M)
Sector
Value ($M)
Sector
51 BlackBerry
86,057 Technology
13,734 Technology
52 Chase
71,379 Technology
12,782 Financial

Bank of America
Citi
HP
BMW
ICBC

70,887
58,208
57,225
55,335
55,206
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Financial
Financial
Technology
Cars
Financial

Nike
Canon
AT&T
Starbucks
Goldman
Sachs
Samsung
Nissan
Marks &
Spencer
Amazon
Yahoo!
Morgan
Stanley
UBS
eBay
H&M
Wachovia
Ford

12,499
12,398
12,030
12,011
11,944

Apparel
Technology
Mobile
Fast Food
Financial

11,870 Technology
11,707 Cars
11,600 Retail
11,511 Retail
11,465 Technology
11,327 Financial
11,220
11,200
11,182
11,022
10,971

Financial
Retail
Apparel
Financial
Cars

Rank

Brand

19 Louis Vuitton
20 American
Express
21 Wells Fargo

Table A-1: List of Brands Used as Search Queries
Brand
Market
Rank
Brand
Brand
Market
Value ($M)
Sector
Value ($M)
Sector
69 Chevrolet
25,739 Luxury
10,862 Cars
70 Budweiser
24,816 Financial
10,839 Beverages
24,739 Financial

71 Colgate

22 Cisco

24,101 Technology

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Disney
UPS
Tesco
Oracle
Intel
Porsche
SAP
Gillette
China Construction Bank
32 Bank of China

23,705
23,610
23,208
22,904
22,027
21,718
21,669
21,523
19,603

72 HarleyDavidson
73 Subway
74 Merrill Lynch
75 JP Morgan
76 Hermès
77 BBVA
78 State Farm
79 Gucci
80 Cartier
81 FedEx

19,418 Financial

82 Tide

33 Verizon Wireless
34 Royal Bank of
Canada
35 HSBC
36 Mercedes
37 Honda
38 L‘Oréal

19,202 Mobile
18,995 Financial

83 T-Mobile
84 Zara

Fast Food
Financial
Financial
Luxury
Financial
Insurance
Luxury
Luxury
Transportation
9,123 Consumer
Goods
8,940 Mobile
8,682 Apparel

18,479
18,044
16,649
16,459

Financial
Cars
Cars
Luxury

85
86
87
88

8,656
8,507
8,437
8,117

39
40
41
42
43
44

15,404
15,378
15,288
15,104
15,080
15,057

Beverages
Retail
Technology
Financial
Financial
Retail

89
90
91
92
93
94

Pepsi
Home Depot
Dell
Deutsche Bank
ING
Carrefour

Entertainment
Transportation
Retail
Technology
Technology
Cars
Technology
Personal Care
Financial

45 NTT DoCoMo
46 Target

15,048 Mobile
14,738 Retail

47 Siemens
48 Banco
Santander
49 Accenture
50 Orange

14,665 Technology
14,549 Financial
14,137 Insurance
14,093 Mobile

Chanel
IKEA
Ariel
Telefónica
Movistar
MTS
Esprit
TIM
Motorola
Barclays
Avon

95 Auchan
96 VW
(Volkswagen)
97 AXA
98 AIG
99 Mastercard
100 Standard
Chartered
Bank
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10,576 Personal
Care
10,401 Motorcycles
10,335
9,802
9,762
9,631
9,457
9,425
9,341
9,285
9,273

Luxury
Retail
Retail
Mobile

8,077
7,907
7,903
7,575
7,382
7,209

Mobile
Apparel
Mobile
Technology
Financial
Consumer
Goods
7,148 Retail
7,143 Cars
7,141 Insurance
7,102 Insurance
6,970 Financial
6,855 Financial
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